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Posts tagged ‘Chinese Culture’

If one looks around in Shanghai, one sees English translations on road signs and subway maps. I asked a local friend why this is so, and she said because Shanghai is a globalized city, and it needs to be ‘friendly’ for international visitors. She compares this to how China had been closed during the Manchu dynasty, which caused the backwardness and ignorance of worldly affairs for many centuries. My reaction to her was, but this is China, why do you have a foreign language on your signage? And if one thinks deeper into it, it becomes a really bad metaphor when a foreign language is giving you directions in your own backyard. But that metaphor is probably a really strong reflection on what’s going on in China right now, or at least the direction that they are headed towards. I had just arrived from New York and so I told my friend that there aren’t Chinese words on the street signage there, and what does that say, but I know for my friend and for most people, English is the de facto language for international relations, diplomacy and trade.

But is it really? Or is it a kind of exclusive club for English-speaking nations that China wants to be part of ? It almost seems that the Chinese language used to be the de facto language for many Asian countries such as Japan, Korea, Vietnam, etc. when China was still an empire. And as China’s power gradually weakened over the last 400 years, the Chinese language lost its place, just like how the French language did, although you can still seem remnants of it in all the various Asian cultures.

I guess the next thing to think about is whether the adoption of a foreign language in your country’s infrastructure helps or harms the country. My friend thinks that it is needed right now, as China is still growing and still ‘immature’, but I beg to differ and think that it belittles the dignity of this ancient civilization. The Chinese civilization is anything but immature. It’s problem is one of self-confidence, which stems from the humiliation of The Opium War, and China will never go far if it keeps looking up to the West, as much as it is growing right now. One can only grow so much from without, but true growth comes from within, and that will only happen when China breaks its shackles from Western dominance and starts to lead again.

The misconception that a lot of people have about Globalization is that it’s about making your city more internationally friendly. Sure it is, but it’s also heavily tilted towards Western culture and honestly the words ‘globalization’ and ‘westernization’ are sometimes interchangeable in my opinion. Some people might judge a city as ‘global’ when it has McDonald’s or Starbucks. Others might judge it by the tall skyscrapers that have replaced historical buildings. No, I am not against Western culture, and in fact I actually think there’s a lot to learn from it; but the bigger issue at hand is the self-cleansing process that China is undergoing which they call ‘modernization’ or ‘globalization’, an idea once again propelled by the humiliation from World War II and the Opium War.

Nelson™ says:
heh
he said
Chinese civilization is so old
thousands of years old
there must be something
behind all this
pre-modernity
惠静 HC,KL says:
uh huh
Nelson™ says:
what keeps chinese civilziation alive for so long
and
he proposes
to find out what it is, and dig it out and re-use it for modernity
惠静 HC,KL says:
orh
Nelson™ says:
which is
not really how i feel
but close
i think im more extreme
惠静 HC,KL says:
?
Nelson™ says:
i want china to reject modernity
惠静 HC,KL says:
复古?
Nelson™ says:
not even
but find a path for themselves
惠静 HC,KL says:
uh huh
Nelson™ says:
modernity is such an european idea
that has influenced the whole worlds
world*
惠静 HC,KL says:
orh
Nelson™ says:
sometimes i also think that USA
is not a country
but a vision for the world
惠静 HC,KL says:
uh huh
Nelson™ says:
that their manifesto requires them to impose their values on others
USA is not a country, but an idea of how the world should be
many races in one country
and have some sort of freedom and democracy
惠静 HC,KL says:
but
Nelson™ says:
and
Singapore adopted that model
before USA, countries/nations were always based on a racial/linguistic model
but i think the USA changed that
惠静 HC,KL says:
uh huh
Nelson™ says:
no wonder Malaysia rejected Singapore
lol
coz Malaysia still bases itself on the traditional model
not good or bad
just saying why its different
惠静 HC,KL says:
cos
sg threatens the malay powerbase
Nelson™ says:
yea
惠静 HC,KL says:
dunno who said, that’s why we incl sabah sarawak
Nelson™ says:
so in the world now there are kind of different kind of nations
some nations are still based on that linguistic/racial model
like China
Japan
Europe
then u have these multi-racial places like Singapore
USA
where else
惠静 HC,KL says:
canada?
Nelson™ says:
yea Canada
right
my indian friend used to make fun of Singapore
say
we are a man-made country
lol
惠静 HC,KL says:
uh huh
why that funny?
Nelson™ says:
dunno
sounds wrong
but i just laugh
惠静 HC,KL says:
orh
Nelson™ says:
i was like
all countries are made up by man, what is she saying
lol
but i think she meant artifical
惠静 HC,KL says:
uh huh
articifial meaning.
Nelson™ says:
so anyway
yea
modernization
also means
unification of all human races
did u know?
惠静 HC,KL says:
westernization
oh
Nelson™ says:
no
惠静 HC,KL says:
orh
Nelson™ says:
its a western idea of trying to unify the world into one global context
like saying
let there be one langauge that everyuone understands
one system that works
one standard
the A4 paper is a product of that modern system
now paper sizes are standardised in Europe
but i dont know if thats good for China
i dont know
惠静 HC,KL says:
china did the unification thing befor
long in history
one chian
Nelson™ says:
ye i know
惠静 HC,KL says:
*china
Nelson™ says:
but
this is different
惠静 HC,KL says:
why\
Nelson™ says:
its not about one china
its about one world
惠静 HC,KL says:
it’s the same.. no?
Nelson™ says:
no
it might mean the wiping out of chinese culture
惠静 HC,KL says:
not race-based
Nelson™ says:
did u ever study post modernism?
惠静 HC,KL says:
no
Nelson™ says:
thats why you have post-modernism in the west now
惠静 HC,KL says:
?
Nelson™ says:
where people reject all this ’standardization’
and homogenity
saying
惠静 HC,KL says:
uh huh
Nelson™ says:
it is detremental to culture
dont try to homogenize culture
dont make everything the same flavour
i want differences
i want chocolate
i want strawberry
dont make everything vanilla
惠静 HC,KL says:
well
it followed from
Nelson™ says:
of coz it is extreme
惠静 HC,KL says:
indus. rev.
Nelson™ says:
but they have a point there
dont give me one size fits all
i want customization
惠静 HC,KL says:
but if u follow the times from industrial revolution
ppl kept growing
more and more ppl in the world
Nelson™ says:
uh huh
惠静 HC,KL says:
w/o mass production
it’s not possible to sustain a lot of things
*s
Nelson™ says:
yes
惠静 HC,KL says:
resources
Nelson™ says:
but then it becomes
utility over culture
惠静 HC,KL says:
mm
men are ruled by what they created
Nelson™ says:
its like saying
we dont need flavours
just
eat a pill
and u are full
惠静 HC,KL says:
uh huh
Nelson™ says:
thats good enough
what for have to chew and taste
惠静 HC,KL says:
to survive?
yes that’s what astronauts do
Nelson™ says:
thats what u;re saying
its kind of existential
and i reject that
惠静 HC,KL says:
but
Nelson™ says:
i think life is more than just surviving
惠静 HC,KL says:
uh huh
Nelson™ says:
u dont eat to live, u live to eat
lol
惠静 HC,KL says:
mm
existential meaning
Nelson™ says:
this sounds like ur existential paper liao
惠静 HC,KL says:
that can only said in today times
orh
as in u said urself exist. only came in the 20th centur
Nelson™ says:
orh
惠静 HC,KL says:
was it always live to eat or did ppl change there too
Nelson™ says:
yes and no
industrialization allowed people to have free time on such a big scale
but i believe before industrialization
the rich people and aristocrats always had free time
惠静 HC,KL says:
uh huh
Nelson™ says:
but it was just a minority
u know when u walk into a department store
惠静 HC,KL says:
then the poor ppl eat to live?
Nelson™ says:
and those people will treat u like King
as a customer
thats the kind of treatment only aristocrats got back in the day
patrons of these exclusive stores
but industrialization changed all that
now eevryone wants to be treated like a exclusive patron
lol
惠静 HC,KL says:
uh huh
Nelson™ says:
yea poor people probably eat to live
i think
i dunno
maybe i should be really poor for a while
to find out
if i change
惠静 HC,KL says:
orh
Nelson™ says:
then i will stop thinking about all this
and think about food all day

Prior to the Opium War, the Chinese had always been proud of their own manifestations. Whether it was in terms of their culture, art or technology, they always saw themselves as superior and looked down on others by calling them ’savages’ (野蛮人)。

This map represents the way the Chinese Emperor positioned himself and his empire among others, as the centre of the Universe, hence the name ‘Middle Kingdom’ (中国). Other examples include Admiral Zheng He’s voyage in the 1400s where he sailed around the world to display the prowess of the Chinese fleet, giving other civilizations gifts as a sign of mercy.

What happened to all that pride then? That confidence and assuredness of one’s own nation? The empires in the vicinity all used to bow down to China; Japan, Korea, Malaya, Thailand, etc. They used to deliver gifts as a gesture of submission and respect, and China would actually return a gift that’s higher in value because China had everything she needed and didn’t need anything from anyone. That was the kind of power China used to have; the empire of empires and the envy of poorer civilizations. How many wars have been fought since the days of Qin Shihuang against the ‘barbarians’ who tried again and again to penetrate into the Chinese civilization, then called Zhongyuan (中元),to acquire the riches and assimilate the culture. Almost like a physical manifestation of this historical phenomenon, the Great Wall was built to ward off these ‘barbarians’, but it never stopped all the different minorities from finally integrating into the Chinese civilization. Don’t forget how Christopher Columbus was looking for a shortcut to China when he sailed West only to stumble upon America, and how people in Europe at that time were seduced by the vast riches and exotic culture of the Orient.

Ironically, it was this pride that caused them their humility. A change that hasn’t yet quite reversed.

Being the envy of other nations, China became complacent. They closed themselves up and never knew much about what was going outside China. Then again, they had too much to deal with internally, always putting down a rebellion or struggling against a famine. When you’re the centre of the world, you don’t worry about insignificant minorities elsewhere, which, if you think about it, sounds a bit like USA right now. And it was one of these insignificant minorities, a country that ‘wasn’t even big enough to be a province in China’, that blew apart her complacency with their superior cannons.

England made the first attack in China over opium and tea. But many nations soon followed suit, and by the time China realized what was happening, it was too late. Like a large beast that was intimidating, it was also slow and clumsy, and could not adapt to the superiority of the little mice in time. And there was the beginning of the fall of the Chinese pride. The Chinese people fell from a race that was honoured by others to a race that became despised and looked down upon. They even earned a new name, ‘The Sick of the Orient’ (东涯病夫), given by the Japanese who could finally stand up against the Chinese after centuries of bowing down to their Chinese neighbours.

As such, the Chinese people started losing faith in their own culture, deeming it as old and ancient, outdated and superstitious. Western cannons had blown up their forts, and Chinese cannons could not reach far enough to hit Western ships, and it made the Chinese think that the West was far ahead in technology. The Chinese had no natural science, no empirical method of proving scientific theories, and so they looked up to the West for their discoveries and formulae. It became a self-rejection of culture and beliefs, like how Chinese medicine had no ’scientific’ proof, according to western standards, even though it was a practice that had existed for thousands of years. Gone with the old, up with the new. It wasn’t only culture that was being rejected, but also the old political system of Emperors and lords. The collapse of the final imperial dynasty was metaphoric for the overthrow of old habits. Yes, we will become a republic. No more slaves of the Empire. We will become modern like the rest of the world and we will regain our pride.

We will become a New China.

In contrast to most other countries who have chosen to adopt the terminology
‘creative industries’ – from the ‘Mapping Document’ issued by the UK government’s Department of Culture, Media and Sports – the Chinese government prefers the term ‘cultural industries’, emphasizing ‘culture,’ or wenhua, over ‘creativity’. The mission to develop cultural industries is necessarily for the enhancement of Chinese culture. Its ultimate goal is not only to resist the consumption and dominance of Hollywood or Western culture in the domestic market, but to export its own cultural products overseas and spread its influence. Thus put in terms of political economy, cultural industries in China can be understood as a combination of cultural nationalism and a form of nascent cultural imperialism.

http://orgnets.net/urban_china/chang

There are traffic lights in Shanghai, and there are road lanes too. But one wonders why they even need it when no one follows them. The cars and bicycles do not stop for the red, and the people never care to wait for the green. There is a certain madness and chaos that goes on everyday on the roads of Shanghai, one that is different from New York, but I have yet to witness an accident. And so life goes on within this chaos, and the individual survives in a self-reliant way; it is Darwinism being played out on an everyday basis, and only the strong prevail.

Allow me to elaborate a little more. When one tries to cross a junction, and does so when the light is green, he will realize that the cars and bicycles continue to pass through, and in an unmerciful and obstinate way. Likewise, the pedestrains cross during the red light too, disregarding the traffic but only caring for their destination and their safety. As such, the people are really good at avoiding cars and crossing the road spontaneously whenever they see a chance, and the cars are also excellent at swerving through crowds of people and not causing any accidents. But one has to be forceful and aggressive in order to move forward on the road, because if you give way to others, no one will give way to you. I was once stuck at a zebra crossing for half an hour because none of the cars would stop for me, and i should have known since they don’t even stop for the red light.  

This same principle is also observed in subway stations, especially in the morning and the weekends, when swarms of people rush into trains and into the bottleneck of escalators. If you’re not pushing your way through, you will never get into the train or get on the escalator, and people will just cut in front of you with no mercy. People in Shanghai walk really fast, and they charge through crowds; sometimes one thinks that the subway station is a good place for soccer or basketball dribbling practice because you have to learn to meander and cut through the gaps in order to proceed forward. It is again the same for hailing cabs, where people will cut the line or steal your cabs even if you came before them. Such is the way of life here, where everyone fends for himself, watches his own back, and somehow it works out.

But there is also a certain sense of selfishness that comes out of this, a self-preservation attitude that only cares about saving one’s own skin without care for others. It’s sort of a mentality that arises from a lack of resources, where if only 3 people out of 10 people are getting something, then I will make sure that I am one of the 3, and too bad for the other 7. Should people step back and try to access the situation from a larger perspective and say, hey we should worry about the other 7 too, and take care of those around us? I wonder. But perhaps China has always been a place where there is not enough of anything, and too much people, thus giving birth to this sort of self-centered attitude.

No wonder Chinese people rejected Han Fei Tse’s teachings of law and restrictions. No wonder Chinese people never liked rules and regulations. They hate being boxed in, hate having lines drawn. Whatever boundary that you might have, the Chinese have found a way to break it regardless, or go around it. It’s ironic when people say the Chinese lack creativity, because I think they actually have a capacity to overcome anything with their strong sense of survival and disregard for boundaries. And yet because the Chinese civilization is so stubborn and formidable, their government has always tried to tame them with standards, from the time of Qin Shihuang to the present of the Communist government. But try as they might, they have never fully controlled or contained this wilful spirit. And things will change even more now, with the introduction of the internet, as divisions are collapsed and new networks are formed, which is resulting in the loss of media control by the government.

I had a conversation with a colleague about cultures in China. He told me about how many different forms of the Han culture exist throughout China, due to the political and social circumstances over time. He remarked that if you went to Guizhou, you would see Han people dressed in a weird way, different from what we understand about most Han Chinese, and he explained it was because they were people who escaped from war during the Ming Dynasty and settled there. It was as if time had stopped for these people, and they preserved that particular moment in history, and with it its culture and memory. If one takes this theory to a broader level, one could easily theorize that the evolution and history of Chinese culture was essentially spread out geographically in China. Time was preserved in packets of space.

He gave another example of the Hakka people, known as 客家 in Mandarin, which mean the ‘guests’. The Hakka people still exist today, all over the world, but they derived the name from the Han people who migrated South during political unrest in the North, taking with them their cultures and language, and thus preserving it in a different place. My colleagues claims that these people were actually the ‘purer’ Han Chinese who once belonged to the central part of China known as ‘Zhong Yuan’ (中原).

And so we came to this discussion about the idea of purity. Purity of culture, language, and blood. Races mix all the time. When the Chinese migrated to Southeast Asia, they mixed with the local natives, the Malays, to form a new breed known as the Babas and Nonyas. Everywhere people migrated, over time, their bloods mixed, their cultures and languages synthesized. It’s almost like everyone has a bit of everyone else’s blood. So what is ‘pure’?

We came to the conclusion that the Han Chinese blood itself was also a mixture. We took the analogy of a soup. You have a bit of salt, some carrot, some pork, and then you mix it for a long time. This brew becomes very homogenous over time, and it’s hard to tell what the soup was even made of if you didn’t know the ingredients. Using this analogy, every race and culture was essentially a mixture of some other forms. It was only a matter of how long this particular brew managed to sustain itself, and allow itself to be cooked. The Chinese race continued to absorb and synthesize with other cultures over thousands of years, and is still doing so today, more so with the West now. One could think of the different cultures in China as the different flavours and brews that had cooked over the centuries, analogous to the different recipes of food in China. The different flavours of food is symbolic in a sense, to the different cultures that had been fostered over time and space.

If one takes the soup analogy to another level, one can view some new nations as the beginnings of new flavours of soup. Singapore is probably a good example, although the fusion of different languages to form a common one is a healthy sign of its primal synthesis. I have another friend who once wished the world had no borders. As much as that would make the world much more free-flowing, it does threaten the diversity of cultures. Almost like bacteria in science, they cannot be cultivated without certain conditions. Every living organism thrived in its own optimum condition, and if the whole world existed in the same manner without borders or limits, there would only be one type of organism growing in it. The existence of borders allows different cultures to be formed, different ’soups’ to be brewed, different ratios of people to be mixed.

Now, there is also a different argument for this, a different way to look at it. Because as much as synthesizing different cultures eliminates the presence of existing cultures, it also helps to create new ones. Everyday new things are being created, and old things are being made extinct. There is a sort of sadness to things being lost, a culture so old only to vanish after the last of its kind returns back to the Earth. With him, he takes centuries of knowledge and wisdom to his grave, never to be seen by his children again, as they are diluted with other forms of culture, or globalized by the modern world. It’s as good as seeing an endangered species become extinct after centuries of evolution, wiped out in a single blow.

I guess the only fear is that cultures become wiped out faster than they can brew, because they do take some time to cultivate again, for life doesn’t evolve overnight. As much as culture is a soup that brews over time, we must remember that when we overturn the soup, we also lose time.

Jeroen de Kloet is the author of China with a Cut, which looks into the dakou culture and then the ensuing commercialism of China’s music market.

The book is available directly on the Amsterdam University Press website.


China with a Cut; extract from pp. 17-25

by Jeroen de Kloet

Dakou

In 1999, China’s most prolific rock critic, artist and entrepreneur Yan Jun published, together with Ou Ning, an overview of the bands he considered emblematic of what they coined as the Beijing New Sound movement (Yan & Ou 1999). Their book is dedicated to the dakou generation of China. At about the same time, Fu Chung, manager of the small Beijing record label New Bees, dedicated his first release of poppunk band The Flowers to the sellers of dakou tapes at Zhong Tu Men – one of the spots in Beijing where they are sold. Among many other meanings, da stands for strike, break, smash, attack, and kou stands for opening, entrance, cut. Together, dakou stands for the cut CDs and tapes being sold in urban China, often along with pirated CDs, on a bustling black market.

Dakou CDs are dumped by the West, intended to be recycled, but instead are smuggled into China. Dakou CDs and tapes are cut to prevent them from being sold. However, since a CD player reads CDs from the centre back to the margin, only the last part is lost. Not only have these CDs been tremendously nourishing for Chinese rock musicians in the 1990s, as they opened up a musical space that did not officially exist in China, they have also come to signify a whole urban generation. As rock critic Dundee explained (Dundee 1999: 28):

This plastic rubbish dumped by foreign record companies becomes a major source of pleasure for those discontented youths after they switch off their TV. When this plastic rubbish started flowing from the south to Beijing, it actually heralded a new rock era. All the new rock musicians in Beijing have grown up with dakou tapes.

It is remarkable that an urban generation chooses to name itself after an illegal product dumped by the West. On one Internet discussion site, You Dali presents a description of the dakou generation that is worth quoting at length. He writes:

Dakou cassette tape, dakou CD, dakou video, dakou MD, dakou vendors, dakou consumers, dakou musicians, dakou music critics, dakou magazines, dakou photo books; this is a dakou world, a new life where you don’t even have to leave the country to realise your spiritual adventure. When Americans fiercely give themselves a cut, they also give the world a possibility of communism and unity. The Government doesn’t encourage 1.3 billion people to listen to rock and roll. A small bunch of them therefore secretly look for offerings to their ears, to their eyes, to their brains, and to their generation. If you can’t do it openly, do it secretly! (…) It enables not only part of the population to become rich first, but also another part of the population to become poor first, and it also enables part of the population to become spiritually strong! Dakou products have ushered 1 million Chinese youths into a new wave, a new listening sensibility, a new awareness, a new mind and a new set of values. Whether the dakou generation is a jinkou [import] generation or a chukou [export] generation confuses quite a few social observers.3

This is a parody of propaganda talk, such as the reference to Deng Xiaoping’s famous defence of his reform policy, in which he declared that one part of the population should be allowed to become rich first. There is a certain critical irony toward the US, which ‘gives itself a cut’ and thereby supports a communist world. At the same time there is a critique of the Chinese state, which, according to this author, restricts the sound of rock. Also, the text evokes feelings of excitement and energy: The idea of being dakou seems empowering enough to build one’s life upon. It is not just a cut in a CD, but an identity bordering on the permissible.

According to Yan Jun, the dakou generation ‘represents a generation that refuses to be
suppressed, that seeks unseeingly, that connects to the underground, that creates marginal culture and lifestyle, that grows stubbornly, that resists and struggles.’ (Yan 2004: 176) His reading presents one side of being dakou, as it celebrates the rebellious. As this book will show, dakou culture is more diverse and more ambiguous. It is important to note that the label emerged at a time when youth culture – and Chinese culture in general – was critiqued for having lost its political zeal. Yan Jun’s claim to subversion can be read as an attempt to recuperate the marginal in a time when many observers flattened Chinese realities out under a singular blanket of alleged commercialization that was assumed to co-opt and silence any potential for critique. As Wang argues rather belittlingly, ‘The 1990s was actually an era that threw people into illusions, blindness, and horror, but this new thought appeals to shallowness and arrogance, exerting itself to cover a chaotic, bitter reality and at least to temporarily relieve anxieties.’ (2003: 602) Probably even more nihilistic, if not cynical, is Geremie Barmé’s In The Red – one of the most comprehensive overviews of the cultural field in the 1990s. Unfortunately, his overview comes with a wide array of unqualified and undertheorised adjectives to pigeonhole Chinese artists and dissidents. For example, in his view, ‘The quality of [Cui Jian’s] later work and the corpus of his music probably would have condemned him to a short-lived career in a normal cultural market, but the unsteady politics of mainland repression lent him a long-term validity and the appeal reserved for a veteran campaigner.’ (1999: 131)4

This book will show how developments in music culture over the 1990s up to today challenge cynical accounts and easy generalisations. By now, dakou has also become a label of the past, of a time when, according to rock musician Feng Jiangzhou, people still had the ability to focus, to concentrate on and indulge fully in music. Now, with the emergence of the Internet, people live, in Feng’s nostalgic view, in an utterly fragmented attention economy, and music is at most one of the many activities in which young people indulge:

I used to buy a lot of dakou cassettes. I studied the music carefully with all my heart. I conducted very detailed work. Part of the reason was that my source of information was simply limited and detailed work was my only solution. I benefited a lot from this work style. Now there is a vast sea of information on the Internet, people listen to music casually. You just have so much information to receive that you don’t know what one to choose. It has become my habit that I’m very selective in information, unlike the young people today, they know everything, but only a little.5

Balinghou

With the digitisation of music, the abundance of impulses has amplified. The current availability of sounds all over the world, where the most exotic or obscure sounds are just one click away on the Internet, has rendered the dakou market nearly obsolete. By the same token, beginning bands can easily upload their work. MySpace offers ample opportunities for Chinese bands for promotion and distribution – circumventing the music industry as well as the censors. In a country that seems particularly keen to periodise, these developments have given birth to yet another term for a generation conveniently classified by a decade: the 1980s (balinghou). This new generation of ‘little emperors,’ as they are often cynically referred to, all come from one-child families, born after the Cultural Revolution. For them, China has always been a country which is opening up, a place of rapid economic progress and modernisation, a place of prosperity and increased abundance, in particular in the urban areas. For this generation, ‘June 4th’ – the term commonly used to refer to the Tiananmen student demonstrations of 1989 – is an event of a long forgotten past, if they remember it at all. The Chinese Communist Party is a tool for networking; becoming a member facilitates one’s career. Different labels are used, besides balinghou, for this generation, like ‘linglei’ (alternative), ‘the birds’ nest generation,’ and the ‘zhongnanhai generation,’ named after a cigarette brand name. Zhongnanhai – also the central headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party, close to the Forbidden City – is the song title of one track by Carsick Cars…

* * *

‘Everyday I am somebody else,’ sings Shen Lihui in one of his songs from 1997, an apt
prediction of the spirit of the 80s generation, a spirit which became increasingly important in order to keep in tune with a post-socialist China of the 21st century. The celebration of agency as evoked by the references to individualism tends to ignore the more structural conditions that contain, steer and produce subjectivities like ‘the 80s generation.’ On a par with the assumed relation between modernization and individualisation, this generation is often accused in public discourse of being selfish and overtly materialistic, a generation driven by pleasure rather than politics, for whom ‘being alternative’ – linglei (other species) – has become merely a lifestyle choice (J. Wang 2008: 228). A generation for which life has to be niubi – literally, a cow’s vagina, metaphorically standing for cool and exciting.


Notes

  1. At www.guangzhou.elong.com/theme/themei48.html, accessed 12 July 2000.
  2. Other examples in which he all too sweepingly critiques Chinese artists are, for example, his critique of writer Wang Shuo (1999: 97), of film director Chen Kaige (Barme 1999: 194) and of film director Zhang Yuan: ‘… Zhang Yuan’s work, with unswerving entrepreneurship, had hit on an issue [homosexuality] sure to appeal to the international art-house world and its attendant critics. (…) [The gay scene] was being depicted partly for its sensational value by a director who had an established record of overcoming his filmic deficiencies by pursuing the controversial.’ (196) Unfortunately, he fails to make explicit what precisely, for example, Zhang Yuan’s ‘filmic deficiencies’ are.
  3. Qiu Ye speaks with a likeminded nostalgia about the dakou era: ‘The mid-1990s were really exciting, I felt very fulfilled at that time, now the cultural environment is much better that those days in terms of material conditions. My personal feeling is that the environment of rock music is more embarrassing than Chinese soccer. The latter is too lazy, they go to sleep after dinner, the former was too hungry, it pleases whoever serves food.’ (in Anonymous 2008: 107)

Bibliography for this excerpt

  • Barmé, G. (1999). In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture. New York: Columbia University Press.
  • Dundee, (1999). ‘Beijing Yaogun: Smells Like Teen spirit (Beijing Rock: Smells Like Teen spirit)’, Yinyue Tiantang (Music Heaven), 31, 26-28.

via http://www.danwei.org/china_books/jeroen_de_kloets_china_with_a.php

Chan Koonchung Interview from Danwei on Vimeo.

近来最火的一本书,偏偏在中国内地的书店里是买不到的——这本书是香港作家陈冠中写的,叫《盛世:中国,2013》
陈冠中是在香港创办《号外》杂志的文化人,跟陈冠希老师没啥关系。《盛世:中国,2013》不知道算不算是一部政治寓言小说,讲的是到了2013年,全球 经济由于金融海啸进入冰河期,而中国却安然避过劫难,反而开始步入千年一遇的盛世,取代美国成为全球政治、经济和文化的核心国。由于我刚看了个开头,所以 到底陈冠希,噢不,陈冠中老师想反映个什么问题,还没看出个端倪。等看过之后,咱再交流。
《盛世:中国,2013》仅在香港地区出版销售,售价70港币。内地读者如果想看,只有去淘宝的网店里购买,估计这本书在中国内地正式出版几乎是没有希望的。
感人的是:为了方便广大中国内地读者读到这本书,陈冠中老师毅然决定盗版自己的书,他亲自校对了一份《盛世:中国,2013》的电子版,然后委托网友放到互联网上,供大家免费下载阅读。为了陈冠中老师这份热情,咱也得疯狂传播一下不是?
《盛世:中国,2013》PDF电子版的下载地址:
地址1
地址2
地址3

由于是经过作者授权的,所以我在下载的时候,从来没有感觉这么理直气壮过。哈哈。

http://shazhude.net/20100204/606/

Thanks to all the readers who have commented on my previous article in the Stone “Kung Fu for Philosophers.” I found many comments thoughtful and inspiring, for which I am deeply grateful. Instead of trying to respond to all, as it is obviously impractical, I would like to offer some additional remarks to supplement my previous article as my response.

Peimin Ni“Kung Fu”

Several years ago, I was invited for lunch by a man named Wu Bin, who was the former martial arts coach of the kung fu movie star Jet Li. Mr. Wu and I did not know each other, and I had no idea why he invited me for lunch. I was more puzzled when I got there — Mr. Wu insisted that I be seated in the most prominent spot, and placed himself and all his associates at the table in lesser positions. With the ritual setting in order, he then humbly presented me a classic martial arts manual, and asked if I could explain the introduction of the book for him. “It is full of philosophical terms,” he said. “I have trouble understanding it.”

I looked at the manual. It was on a martial arts style called xingyi quan. While the main body of the book was about postures and movements of the body and energy, which Mr. Wu had no trouble interpreting, the introduction was basically a treatise about metaphysics. It contained views derived from the Song dynasty neo-Confucian scholar Zhou Dunyi, in which an abstract concept, calledwuji, the ultimate non-being, takes a central role as ontologically prior to taiji (t’ai chi), or “the primordial ultimate.” Oddly enough, the author offered no indication about how the ideas should be translated into the martial arts, as if it were all self-evident.

Thanks to Mr. Wu’s practical background and drawing on my own philosophical training and experience in the practice of Chinese calligraphy art — a form of kung fu which is deeply influenced by traditional Chinese philosophy — it did not take me long to convey the basic ideas to him and help him see the intellectual connection between the metaphysics and the martial arts, though we both aware perfectly well that it would take lots of cultivation for the connection to be embodied and manifested in the practice. The point is basically to empty oneself (including the metaphysical idea), so that, paradoxically, one can achieve unification of the self and the world! Mr. Wu sighed, regretfully, “Today’s martial arts practitioners focus too much on the surface performances. That is not real kung fu!”

I  share this story here is because a few commenters raised the question of whether my original post was denouncing the practical significance of the theoretical pursuit for truth, despite the fact that I wrote, “Philosophers’ ideas, even when theoretical, have never stopped functioning as guides to human life.” The misreading, however, made me aware that I need to give the other side of the practical-theoretical coin the weight that it deserves.

Even though, as I wrote in the first post, a menu should not be mistaken for food, this does not mean that the menu is worthless for getting food, nor does it entail the demand that everything that can serve as a menu must be created for the sake of getting food. What is “alarming” is not that some people like to think for thinking’s sake or purely for the search of truth; it is rather that when this way of doing philosophy becomes dominant, we tend to forget that there can be other ways of thinking and other values or implications of philosophizing. Just as Zhou Dunyi’s metaphysics can be taken as a guiding principle for xingyi quan, calligraphy, or any other kung fu defined in the broad way and not merely as a mirror of reality, virtually all philosophical ideas can inform human practice and have practical implications. Hence the relationship between kung fu and philosophy goes both ways: As much as we philosophers need to open our vision for the kung fu perspective, all forms of kung fu depend on philosophical ideas, one way or another. Whether good or bad, theories mold our patterns of behavior and even transform us. While attachment to conceptual truth will block one’s path toward higher levels of kung fu, so will a kung fu practitioner have trouble reaching higher stages of perfection if they lack good philosophical guidance, including proper conceptual resources.

Trying to obtain the truth and yet frustrated by the postmodern deconstruction of the project, many people today find themselves facing the dilemma of either embracing relativism or falling back to dogmatic absolutism. The kung fu approach helps us to see the instructional value of our apparently endless philosophical disputes. This is exactly why I propose the term “kung fu,” understood properly, as not only a guide toward more fruitful reading of traditional Chinese philosophy but also as an approach (though obviously not as the only approach) through which we can evaluate philosophies of all traditions.

We philosophers are proud of discovering hidden assumptions and often feel that we have beaten every bush and asked all the perennial questions that philosophers care to ask. But it does not take much reflection to realize that we devote a lot of attention to the pursuit of propositional truth and very little toward exploring the the transformation of the human subject. We have fields of study that bare some proximity to the subject, such as action theory andpraxiology, but one thing that may push these fields of study further is for us to move our focus from mere actions or praxis to kung fu — namely to the transformation and enabling of the human subject. Could the concept of “kung fu” link the practitioner to action in such a way that actions would no longer be treated merely as the result of rational choices or impulses or technical/managerial procedures, but also as the result of cultivation? Could it lead to a shift in our study of human actions and praxis similar to the one in ethics that resulted in a renewed interest in the moral agent? There is a lot of work to do.

Perhaps I did a fine job in helping Mr. Wu, but I can’t help feeling uneasy about the prominent seat that Mr. Wu had me sit in. We philosophers are wise more in the sense of knowing that we don’t know, but on the other hand, people like Mr. Wu look up to us for our guidance, and they have a good reason for that — because our philosophical ideas do matter.


Peimin Ni

Peimin Ni is professor of philosophy at Grand Valley State University. He currently serves as the president of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophyand is editor-in-chief of a book series on Chinese and comparative philosophy. His most recent book is “Confucius: Making the Way Great.”

via http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/21/philosophers-for-kung-fu-a-response/